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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW RBVIEW
Evidence Law
I. EXTENT OF PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY
IN HOSPTIAL PEER REVIEW PROCESS DEFINED
In McGee v. Bruce Hospital System' the South Carolina Supreme Court
interpreted for the first time South Carolina Code section 40-71-202, which
exempts from subpoena, discovery, and introduction into evidence the
information acquired by hospital peer review committees. The court held that
although no information acquired by a committee in the exercise of its duties
may be discovered from the committee, any information not originating in the
committee may be discovered from its original source? The court also ruled
that the statute protected neither general policies and procedures for staff
monitoring nor a committee's final decisions.4 As the court interpreted it, this
statute provides that while litigants will be denied a convenient source for
discovering specific information acquired but not generated by a committee,
the statute does not preclude them from obtaining the information from its
original source.
McGee arose out of a medical malpractice wrongful death claim. During
discovery, the plaintiff sought to obtain from the hospital (1) documentation
delineating staff privileges including, but not limited to, applications for staff
privileges and any proof of training or experience submitted in relation to an
application for such privileges and (2) all medical staff monitoring and
1. __ S.C. _, 439 S.E.2d 257 (1993).
2. All proceedings of and all data and information acquired by the committee
referred to in Section 40-71-10 in the exercise of its duties are confidential
unless a respondent in the proceeding requests in writing that they be made
public. These proceedings and documents are not subject to discovery,
subpoena, or introduction into evidence in any civil action except upon
appeal from the committee action. Information, documents, or records
which are otherwise available from original sources are not immune from
discovery or use in a civil action merely because they were presented during
the committee proceedings nor shall any complainant or witness before the
committee be prevented from testifying in a civil action as to matters of
which he has knowledge apart from the committee proceedings or revealing
such matters to third persons. Confidentiality provisions do not prevent
committees appointed by the Department of Health and Environmental
Control from issuing reports containing solely nonidentifying data and
information.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-71-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
3. McGee, _ S.C. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 260.
4. Id. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 260.
[Vol. 46
1
Fitzer and Price: Evidence Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
EVIDENCE LAW
evaluation policies and procedures.' The hospital refused, claiming a peer
review privilege. Plaintiff filed a motion to compel production, which the trial
judge granted.' The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the defendants'
petition for certiorari.
The trial judge ruled that the requested information was not privileged,
reasoning that section 40-71-20 provides no protection to information
otherwise available from original sources. The trial court held further that the
statute does not protect policies and procedures for staff monitoring.' Thus,
the trial judge interpreted section 40-71-20 as protecting only information
generated by the committee.
The supreme court found that the statute creates a broader zone of
protection. It found that the public interest in candid peer review proceedings
should prevail over litigants' need for a convenient source of information.
The court adopted the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the policy
behind Florida's medical peer review statute. The Florida court noted that the
overriding public policy supporting the statute encourages health care
professionals to take part in a frank, candid peer review process and, in so
doing, to maintain and improve the quality of medical practice
5. Id. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 259. The governing body of Bruce Hospital approved the
formation of the Medical Staff of Bruce Hospital System (Medical Staff) to supervise the quality
of medical care provided by the hospital. The Medical Staff fit within the scope of a committee
described in section 40-71-10 because one of its purposes was:
[t]o insure a high level of ethical conduct and professional performance of all
practitioners authorized to practice in the hospital through the appropriate delineation
of the clinical privileges that each practitioner may exercise in the hospital and
through an ongoing review and evaluation of each practitioner's performance in the
hospital.
Brief of Petitioner at 3-4 (quoting Article II, By-Laws of the Medical Staff of Bruce Hospital
System).
Furthermore, Article V of the bylaws outlines the procedure for appointment and
reappointmentofhospitalprivileges. The applicantmust file a detailed applicationwhich requires
references from other physicians and disclosure of any past disciplinary incidents. The applicant
also must submit to interviews and allow the hospital to consult with members of the medical staff
and others concerning the applicant's competence, character, and ethical and moral qualifications.
The Executive Committee evaluates the information and makes a recommendation. This process
is repeated periodically for reappointment to hospital privileges. Id. at 4-5.
6. At this point the physicians intervened and, in conjunction with the defendant hospital,
filed a motion for reconsideration that the trial court denied. Id. at 2.
7. McGee, _ S.C. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 259.
8. Id. at _, 439 S.E.2d 259-60 (citing Cruger v. Love, 599 So.2d 111 (Fla. 1992)).
Cruger resolved a split in the Florida precedent between Tarpon Springs General Hospital v.
Hudak, 556 So.2d 831 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that an application for privileges is
necessarily part of the records of a medical review committee and is therefore privileged from
discovery) and Jacksonville Medical Center, Inc. v. Akers, 560 So.2d 1313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
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The McGee court followed Cruger which held that committee information
that is otherwise obtainable from its original source is not discoverable from
the committee. McGee states, "The underlying purpose behind the confidenti-
ality statute is not to facilitate the prosecution of civil actions, but to promote
complete candor and open discussion among participants in the peer review
process. "9
The South Carolina court noted also that the statute's language extending
the privilege to "all data and information ACQUIRED by the committee"'"
evidenced the legislature's intent to protect not only documents generated by
a committee but also documents acquired by a committee." However, the
court interpreted the "otherwise available" language as indicating that a
committee could not keep a document from being discovered merely by
including it in its proceeding. Therefore, the court concluded that the statute
does not protect from discovery any documents otherwise available from their
original source, but it does preclude the litigant from obtaining them from the
committee. Furthermore, because the court found that the applications for
staff privileges and supporting documents of appropriate training were
committee records, the confidentiality statute protected them. '
2
Finally, the court added that the statute does not prevent the discovery of
general policies and procedures for staff monitoring, nor does it make
confidential the committee's final recommendation.' 3 The court believed
such discovery would not thwart the goal of promoting candid evaluation.
Thus, the court reversed the part of the lower court order granting plaintiff the
right to discover credentialing files but affirmed the portion granting the right
to discover statements of clinical privileges and the general policies and
procedures. 14
In deciding that the public interest in frank and honest peer review
proceedings should prevail over the litigant's need for information from its
most convenient source, the court adopted the Florida Supreme Court's
reasoning in Cruger v. Love. In that case, the court interpreted statutory
language almost identical to the relevant language in McGee.'5 In Cruger a
mother bringing suit for negligent treatment of her son's fractured thumb
sought to discover a physician's applications for hospital privileges. 6 Noting
the policy behind the statute - to promote candor in the peer evaluation
process - the Florida court assumed that the legislature balanced the benefits
9. McGee, _ S.C. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 259 (citing Cruger, 599 So. 2d 111).
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-17-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
11. McGee, _ S.C. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 260.
12. Id. at __, 439 S.E.2d at 260.
13. Id. at , 439 S.E. 2d at 260.
14. Id. at __,439 S.E.2d at 261.
15. FLA. STAT. ch. 766.101(5) (Supp. 1992).
16. Cruger, 599 So. 2d at 112.
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gained by the privilege against the litigants' fights to obtain information. 7
Consequently, the Florida court held hat a party can discover from the
committee neither records originating in nor those acquired by an evaluation
committee. However, records merely acquired by the committee may be
sought from their original sources.'"
The South Carolina court also adopted Cruger's conclusion that protecting
physicians' applications furthers the policy behind peer review statutes. The
court correctly stated that the overriding public policy behind that statute is to
allow frank, candid review in the peer review process.19 However, the court
goes on to draw the questionable conclusion that this policy is furthered by
protecting from discovery applications for staff privileges."° The statute's
language clearly warrants that a litigant may not obtain these applications from
the committees. 21  However, the policy considerations supporting the
protection of peer review proceedings do not support the protection of
privilege applications.
First, the objectives served by protecting committee members' conclusions
and the facts considered in reaching these conclusions differ from the
objectives served by protecting doctors' applications. Protecting reviewers'
thought processes attracts people to take part in the process and encourages a
thorough and candid review.
Attraction of participants does not apply to doctors' completion of their
staff privilege applications. Whether the applications are discoverable, doctors
will continue to seek hospital privileges. Thus, the theory remaining is that
protecting applications would induce doctors to complete them accurately. The
court's language suggests that this is what it believed.'
This objective differs from encouragement of frank and candid review.
Interpretation and judgement play prominent roles in the reviewing process.
It is important therefore that reviewers be completely objective throughout the
process. With privilege applications, however, less room for interpretation
and personal judgement exists, and thus, there is much less need to take extra
measures to maintain a doctor's objectivity. A statement that doctors need
statutory protection to ensure proper completion of their applications assumes
that doctors will lie absent such protection. Such an assumption reflects a
17. Id. at 114.
18. Id.
19. McGee, __ S.C. at__, 439 S.E.2d at 259.
20. Id. at __, 439 S.E.2d at 257.
21. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-71-20.
22. The court adopted the following language from Cruger: "[I]t is essential that doctors
seeking hospital privileges disclose all pertinent information to the committee. Physicians who
fear that information provided in an application might someday be used against them by a third
party will be reluctant to fully detail matters that the committee should consider." McGee, __
S.C. at __, 439 S.E.2d at 260 (quoting Cruger, 599 So. 2d at 114).
1994]
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complete lack of confidence in the integrity of the medical community. Thus,
it is doubtful that the legislature felt the need for such protection.
More significantly, even if the legislature doubted that some doctors
would submit complete and accurate applications without statutory protection,
it is not apparent how granting protection would alleviate the problem. A
doctor willing to lie or omit important facts to help himself in a future lawsuit
probably would be willing to do the same to obtain more hospital privileges.
At least if the application were discoverable, the doctor would know that there
is a possibility that his misrepresentations could be discovered if the applica-
tion ended up in the hands of a hostile attorney. Because it is not obtainable,
however, only the evaluation committee can review it. Thus, protecting the
applications from discovery actually encourages dishonesty, thereby undercut-
ting the very purpose for the medical evaluation privilege.
By describing the policy behind the statute to justify its broad zone of
protection, the court stretched that policy out of its original shape. When the
court extended the rationale beyond the protection of the objectivity of health
care professionals in their judgments of their peers to include inducement of
doctors to complete accurately their privilege applications, the court likely
ventured further than the legislature intended to go. The court's expansive
interpretation does not affect the outcome of those cases clearly falling within
the statute's language. However, in close cases where courts will look to
McGee's policy statements for guidance, the court's broad extension could
make a difference.
One class of information that could be affected by McGee is incident
reports and reports requested by a committee when an accident occurs.
3
Like the physicians' applications, incident or factual reports are largely factual
accounts for which all that is needed is an honest reporting of past events.
Thus, the accurate completion of these reports is not jeopardized by physic-
ians' reluctance to participate nor by their inability to remain objective in
preparing them. However, as with applications, physicians have a great
incentive to omit or inaccurately report damaging facts. Furthermore, the
nonreplicability of factual accounts provides medical personnel an added
incentive to misrepresent the events that transpired in the course of his
treatment. Thus, because McGee found that the policy considerations behind
the statute include a concern about physicians' reluctance to accurately
complete their privilege applications, then, arguably, the statute should also
protect factual reports.
23. Such reports often raise issues of attorney-client privilege. See Ware v. Miami Valley
Hosp., 604 N.E.2d 791 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)(holding that attorney-clientprivilege protected the
report). But see Kay Lab., Inc. v. District Court, 653 P.2d 721 (Colo. 1982)(en banc)(holding




Fitzer and Price: Evidence Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
1994] EVIDENCE LAW
The fact that the rationale behind section 40-71-20 does not seem to reach
the limits of the scope of the language suggests that the legislature may have
drawn a bright line to limit litigation over which documents the statute
protects. Were South Carolina courts to try to protect only those documents
whose protection serves the rationale behind peer review privilege, however,
it would have a difficult task in drawing the line. 24
While courts are unlikely to delve into such inquiries and will instead
strictly adhere to the statute's language, courts will face questions of whether
information was acquired "in the exercise of [the committee's] duties. "25 For
example, courts will have to decide at what point an informal investigation by
a committee member becomes a committee investigation.26 Again, McGee
suggests that the policy in favor of ensuring that committee members obtain
as much information as possible would militate in favor of protecting a broad
scope of activity.
The McGee decision has further significance in that it could point to a
possible avenue of relief for some South Carolina litigants who have suffered
adverse discovery decisions. Ordinarily, a party cannot directly appeal an
order denying or compelling discovery because the order is an intermediate or
interlocutory decision unappealable until final judgment.2 McGee demon-
strates, however, that under the proper circumstances the court might grant
certiorari to correct an erred discovery decision.2
24. If South Carolina courts assumed that the legislature was unconcerned with the dishonesty
of health care professionals and only concerned with the subtle bias toward a favorable evaluation
that unconsciously hampers reviewing physicians, then it would have some difficult lines to draw.
In particular, the question arises whether protecting the list of documents that a committee
member reviewed would further the statute's purposes. Hospitals would argue that if the
reviewers knew that plaintiffs' lawyers might find out what documents the reviewers examined,
reviewers would hesitate to examine certain documents for fear of leading attorneys straight to
them. However, as with physicians' applications, it seems unlikely that the bias in favor of the
subject of the review would affect the scope of a reviewer's investigation absent his conscious
decision to allow it to do so.
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-71-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
26. See Zion v. New York Hosp., 585 N.Y.S.2d 393 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (mem.) (holding
investigation made by physician, although requested by Chief of Medicine, was not privileged
where investigation was not undertaken in accordancewith any standard guidelines and no written
report was prepared); Adcox v. Children's Orthopedic Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 864 P.2d 921
(Wash. 1993)(en bane)(holding informal investigation not sufficient to invoke privilege). But see
Roach v. Springfield Clinic, 585 N.E.2d 1070 (III. App. Ct. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
623 N.E.2d 246 (III. 1993) (holding information need not be part of formal report to invoke
privilege).
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-3-330 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1993); Lowndes Prod. Inc. v.
Brower, 262 S.C. 431, 205 S.E.2d 184 (1974).
28. See South Carolina Bd. of Examiners of Optometry v. Cohen, 256 S.C. 13, 180 S.E.2d
650 (1971); Wagner v. Ezell, 249 S.C. 421, 154 S.E.2d 731 (1967); Feldman v. South Carolina
Tax Comm'n, 203 S.C. 49, 26 S.E.2d 22 (1943). In the case of an absence of remedy, the
6
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Although in McGee the court makes no mention of its reasons for granting
certiorari, the case's circumstances suggest that the court granted certiorari
because parties would not appeal the lower court's interpretation until final
judgment of denying the hospital important rights. Not only would the
hospital not appeal until final judgment, it is unlikely that the hospital would
appeal at all upon losing this case, because once it disclosed the information,
the issue would be moot. The plaintiff would have seen the information and
would know where to obtain it from its original sources. Therefore, an appeal
after disclosure would be useless.
If the supreme court had allowed the lower court's ruling to stand,
however, it could have made a large impact in many other situations. The
trial judge interpreted the statute as protecting only materials generated by the
committee. Under such an interpretation, a litigant would have the right to
discover all of the materials that the committee reviewed that originated
outside of the committee. In other words, the litigant could discover which
materials the reviewers found important and could even obtain documents
previously unknown to the litigant. The litigant's ability to follow the trail left
by the reviewers could have the chilling effect that the legislature hoped to
avoid when passing the statute because reviewers might hesitate to examine
certain documents for fear of leading a litigant to them.
In conclusion, McGee's interpretation of the peer review confidentiality
statute gives effect to the statute's broad language. The court's expansive
articulation of the policy concerns that gave rise to the statute should result in
broad interpretations of the privilege by South Carolina courts. Also, McGee
suggests hope for a litigant facing the prospect of answering a discovery
request without any useful avenue of appeal. If the litigant can show that the
issue will not be appealed and that the decision left standing will create a
potentially damaging precedent, then, as here, the supreme court might grant
certiorari.
Matthew B. Kizer
II. CERTAIN POSTINCIDENT BEHAVIOR OF VICTIM
ADMISSIBLE IN SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES
In State v. West' the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed that a
sexual abuse victim's postincident behavior is admissible to prove that the
assault occurred if the probative value of such evidence outweighs its
granting of an extraordinary writ is left to the supreme court's discretion. Floyd v. Thornton, 220
S.C. 414, 68 S.E.2d 334 (1951).
1. __ S.C. - , 438 S.E.2d 256 (Ct. App. 1993).
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prejudicial effect.2 The court may have extended the type of evidence
admissible on postincident behavior by allowing testimony that a child victim
sees a psychologist. The court of appeals also reiterated the overruling of
State v. Bradley3 and State v. Hudnall4 to the extent that they are inconsistent
with State v. Alexander.'
In West the four-year-old victim testified that the defendant "'touched
[her] tu-tu' with his hands" on two separate occasions and "that it hurt...
her 'tu-tu.'" '6 As soon as she suspected molestation, the victim's mother
contacted the police and had the victim examined at a hospital. 7 The trial
court convicted West of criminal sexual conduct with a minor.
8
West raised two issues on appeal. First, he asserted error in the
admission of the victim's videotaped testimony.9 The court of appeals relied
on South Carolina Code section 16-3-1530(G)0 and found no abuse of
discretion in using the victim's videotaped testimony. The defendant argued
that the reasons offered by the State did not prove the need for videotaped
testimony as opposed to live testimony." Courts prefer live testimony, but
parties may use other techniques when "'the trial judge deems them appropri-
ate and adequate.'"' 2 In West the court concluded that the State need not
2. Id. at_, 438 S.E.2d at 258.
3. 293 S.C. 526, 362 S.E.2d 19 (1987).
4. 293 S.C. 97, 359 S.E.2d 59 (1987).
5. 303 S.C 377, 401 S.E.2d 146 (1991); see West, __ S.C. at __ n.2, 438 S.E.2d at 259
n.2.
6. West, __ S.C. at __, 438 S.E.2d at 257 (alteration in original).
7. Id. at , 438 S.E.2d at 258.
8. Id. at __, 438 S.E.2d at 256.
9. Id. at , 438 S.E.2d at 257. The victim did not testify at trial. A videotaped deposition
was played for the jury in place of live testimony because the victim suffered from attention
deficit disorder with hyperactivity and from post traumatic stress disorder. The defendant was
present at the videotaped deposition. Id. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 257.
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (Law. Co-op. 1985) provides:
VICTIMS AND WITNESSES WHO ARE VERY YOUNG, ELDERLY, WHO ARE
HANDICAPPED OR WHO HAVE SPECIAL NEEDS, HAVE A RIGHT TO SPECIAL
RECOGNITION AND ATTENTION BY ALL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, MEDICAL, AND
SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIES.
The court shall treat "special" witnesses sensitively, using closed or taped sessions when
appropriate. The solicitor or defense shall notify the court when a victim or witness
deserves special consideration.
Id.
11. West, _ S.C. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 257-58.
12. Id. at__, 438 S.E.2d at 258 (quoting State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 351, 359, 353 S.E.2d
451, 456 (1987)). In State v. Murrell, 302 S.C.'77, 393 S.E.2d 919 (1990), the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that a trial judge must make a case-specific determination concerning the
need for videotaped testimony, "place the child in as close to a courtroom setting as possible,"
and assure that the defendant is able to see and hear the child, and that the defendant has counsel
present. Id. at 80-81, 393 S.E.2d at 921.
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss1/9
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[
show that the victim feared the defendant or that the defendant's presence
traumatized the victim. The court found that the victim fell within the
language of the statute concerning the special needs of young witnesses. 3
Appellant also asserted error in the admission of the victim's mother's
testimony that the victim was seeing a psychologist. On direct examination,
the victim's mother stated that her child was seeing a psychologist since the
alleged sexual assault. 4 The appellant claimed that this testimony bolstered
the child's claim that the molestation actually occurred."5 The court of
appeals held:
Here there was no expert testimony regarding common behavioral
characteristics. The objectionable testimony is the mere reference by the
mother to the fact the child had seen or was seeing a psychologist. Even
if we were to find the testimony somehow relates to the objectionable
practice proscribed in State v. Hudnall, we hold its probative value
outweighed the illusory prejudicial effect of the testimony .... 
6
West is the most recent in a series of cases in which the court has
struggled with the use of a victim's postincident behavior as evidence that the
assault took place. Some jurisdictions allow testimony of postincident
behavior with the consent defense to rape.' 7 Courts may enter evidence of
changes in behavior and in personality to prove that such changes would not
occurr if the victim consented to intercourse.' 8 Other jurisdictions allow
evidence of mental trauma even when the defendant completely denies sexual
conduct."' Missouri courts now allow evidence of a victim's physical and
psychological changes to prove the elements of criminal sexual conduct.2 °
13. West, _ S.C. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 258.
14. Id. at 438 S.E.2d at 257-58. The victim's mother testified, "We went two weeks
later to the Navy doctors to make sure that the redness and the soreness was going away. And
also we'd been seeing Dr. Evelyn Foster who is a psychologist." Id. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 258.
15. Id. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 258.
16. Id. at , 438 S.E.2d at 259.
17. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 637 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). In Johnson the court
allowed two rape victims to testify about their post-incident behavior where the defendant
admitted intercourse, but claimed it was in exchange for two dollars.
18. See id. at 161.
19. See, e.g., State v. Cummings, 716 P.2d 45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Burke, 719
S.W.2d 887 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
20. See Burke, 719 S.W.2d at 888-89. In Burke the court allowed lay and expert testimony
regarding a victim's physical and psychological changes. The court held that such testimony
would be allowed when the defense consents as well as when the defendant completely denies
sexual contact. Expert witnesses may testify that the psychological changes are consistent with
those resulting from a traumatic sexual experience, but may not label such changes as rape trauma
syndrome. Id. at 889.
[Vol. 46
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South Carolina courts previously refused to allow testimony regarding
common characteristics exhibited by victims of sexual abuse to establish that
the abuse occurred. Courts allowed such evidence only if used to rebut a
defensive claim that a victim's response was inconsistent with such trauma.2
In Hudnall the court held that the State can offer rape trauma evidence only
to explain a seemingly inconsistent response to the rape, such as a retraction
of the allegations of assault or a delayed reporting of abuse.22
The Hudnall court found that expert testimony concerning the victim's
mental trauma was irrelevant and prejudicial and therefore, inadmissible.3
The court distinguished this type of evidence from the battered woman
syndrome evidence held admissible in State v. Hill.24 The court noted that
the expert testimony in Hudnall was not offered to explain seemingly
inconsistent behavior.'
Alexander overruled Hudnall to the extent it was inconsistent. However,
some aspects of the Hudnall holding remain good law. In Hudnall the court
held that a pediatrician's testimony regarding the child's description of the
defendant's alleged acts were inadmissible hearsay evidence.26 Under the
general hearsay rules, a doctor's testimony or medical records about a patient
are admissible only to the extent that they relate to facts given by the patient
that the doctor relied on in reaching his medical conclusions.2 Thus, the
Hudnall holding concerning a doctor's hearsay testimony remains, but the
Hudnall holding concerning mental trauma testimony is overruled.
In West the court of appeals relied on Alexander and State v. Schum-
pert.8 In Alexander the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a rape
victim's mental trauma testimony is relevant to prove the elements of criminal
sexual conduct because such evidence makes it more probable that the offense
occurred.29 In Alexander the defendant admitted intercourse, but claimed it
was in exchange for fifty dollars.3" However, the court held inadmissible the
21. See, e.g., State v. Bradley, 293 S.C. 526, 527, 362 S.E.2d 19, 20 (1987); State v.
Hudnall, 293 S.C. 97, 100, 359 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (1987).
22. See Hudnall, 293 S.C. at 100, 359 S.E.2d at 61-62.
23. Id. at 100, 359 S.E.2d at 62.
24. 287 S.C. 398, 339 S.E.2d 121 (1986). Battered woman syndrome is relevant to prove the
woman's state of mind, but is not a defense itself. The battered woman syndrome explains
seemingly inconsistent behavior of a battered woman who continues to live with a man who beats
her. Hudnall, 293 S.C. at 100, 359 S.E.2d at 61.
25. Hudnall, 293 S.C. at 100, 359 S.E.2d at 62.
26. Id. at 101, 359 S.E.2d at 62.
27. Id. (citing State v. Brown, 286 S.C. 445, 334 S.E.2d 816 (1985) (per curiam)).
28. _ S.C. _, 435 S.E.2d 859 (1993).
29. State v. Alexander, 303 S.C. 377, 381, 401 S.E.2d 146, 149 (1991).
30. Id. at 378-79, 401 S.E.2d at 147-48.
1994]
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victim's testimony concerning her mental trauma,31 which allegedly resulted
from the sexual assault, because the evidence was unduly prejudicial. 2
Courts admit evidence of postincident behavior only when its probative
value outweighs its prejudicial effect.33 Unlike Alexander, in West the State
did not offer into evidence the specific symptoms suffered by the victim and
the particular reasons for seeing a psychologist. The only objectionable
evidence was a mere reference that the victim was seeing a psychologist.
34
The South Carolina courts struggled again with the use of evidence of a
victim's postincident behavior as evidence that the assault actually occurred in
Schumpert. In Schumpert the court recognized rape trauma evidence is
admissible to prove a sexual offense occurred if the probative value of such
evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect.3 5  The trial court in Schumpert
allowed a mental health counselor and a representative from the Department
of Social Services to testify about a child victim's behavioral symptoms that
allegedly resulted from the sexual assault.36 Unlike West, this evidence was
behavioral evidence and expert testimony.
Although the West court discusses the admissibility of rape trauma
evidence and cites other cases concerning rape trauma evidence,3" West itself
does not contain rape trauma evidence. The brief mention of the victim's
seeing a psychologist does not constitute rape trauma evidence. Even
jurisdictions that do not allow expert testimony regarding rape trauma
syndrome will allow evidence of emotional trauma from a lay person, such as
a victim's mother.3
The Hudnall court found error in the admission of expert testimony
concerning rape trauma, but did not consider the effect of a lay person's
testimony concerning the mental trauma suffered by the victim.39 Other
jurisdictions recognize the distinction between lay person testimony and expert
31. The victim testified that since the alleged rape she lost sleep, lost her appetite, was easily
emotionally upset, and could not concentrate on her work. She also testified that she bought a
gun to protect herself. Id. at 380, 401 S.E.2d at 148.
32. Id. at 382, 401 S.E.2d at 149.
33. Id.
34. See State v. West, _ S.C. , , 438 S.E.2d 256, 258 (Ct. App. 1993).
35. State v. Schumpert, _ S.C. , _, 435 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1993) (citing Alexander,
303 S.C. at 377, 401 S.E.2d at 196 (1991)).
36. See id. at _, 435 S.E.2d at 861. The representative from the Department of Social
Services testified that "the victim appeared withdrawn and nervous, was tugging at her clothing,
and had a difficult time maintaining eye contact at their interview." Id. at _, 435 S.E.2d at
861. The representative also testified that the victim's behavior was not normal teenage behavior
and concluded that it was due to criminal child sexual assault. Id. at _, 435 S.E.2d at 861.
37. See West, - S.C. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 258-59.
38. See, e.g., People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 301 (Cal. 1984) (en banc); People v. Pullins,
378 N.W.2d 502, 505 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
39. See State v. Hudnall, 293 S.C. 97, 99-101, 359 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (1987).
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testimony. In Bledsoe the court refused to allow expert testimony concerning
rape trauma evidence, but suggested that a lay person could testify about
similar rape trauma characteristics. 4" The difference lies in that expert
testimony creates "'an aura of special reliability and trustworthiness.'"41 In
Bledsoe the court held that expert testimony concerning rape trauma syndrome
is not admissible because it is not a scientifically reliable means of proving that
a rape occurred. The court stated:
Unlike fingerprints, blood tests, lie detector tests, voice prints or the
battered child syndrome, rape trauma syndrome was not devised to
determine the "truth" or "accuracy" of a particular past event - i.e.,
whether, in fact, a rape in the legal sense occurred - but rather was
developed by professional rape counselors as a therapeutic tool .... I
Because no behavioral evidence or expert testimony exists, the objectionable
testimony in West may have been admissible even if it were not for Schumpert
and Alexander.
In Alexander the South Carolina Supreme Court specifically held that rape
trauma evidence is admissible to prove the elements of criminal sexual
conduct.43 Thus, even if the evidence in West was rape trauma evidence, it
was admissible under South Carolina law. West adds little to the law of
evidence in South Carolina. If West really means that seeing a psychologist
can prove an assault took place, then it is a significant extension of Alexander.
However, it seems unlikely that this is what the court meant. If the court did
mean that seeing a psychologist, without more, evidences that the assault took
place, then the case may raise relevancy problems. While perhaps irrelevant,
that the victim's mother's statement did not prejudice the defendant better
justifies the court's decision." Under the Alexander holding, the mother
could have given much more powerful testimony. She could have testified
concerning her child's behavioral changes as a result of the abuse. The
psychologist also could have offered expert testimony like the social services
representative did in Schumpert. Thus, the objectionable testimony in West
compares mildly to what the state could have offered under the Alexander
holding.
Parmele E. Price
40. See Bledsoe, 681 P.2d at 301.
41. Id. (quoting State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982) (en bane)).
42. Id. at 300 (footnote omitted).
43. See State v. Alexander, 303 S.C. 377, 381, 401 S.E.2d 146, 149 (1991).
44. See State v. West, _ S.C. _, _,438 S.E.2d 256, 258 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting the
trial judge's statement that "if that's all [the victim's mother] was going to say I wasn't going to
send the jury out to hear that, that that [sic] was not prejudicial...").
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